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NOTES
Executory Contracts To Convey the Homestead:
A New Remedy
The plaintiff entered into a contract for the purchase of defendants' urban
homestead. Defendants, husband and wife, later refused to convey this
property in accordance with the executory written contract which each of
them had signed. Plaintiff brought suit to compel specific performance of
the contract for sale. On motion by both parties for summary judgment, the
trial court held for the defendants and refused to compel specific perform-
ance. The court of civil appeals affirmed,' and writ of error was granted
by the Texas Supreme Court. Held, reversed: Because of recent changes
in Texas statutes, specific performance of an executory contract for the sale
of a homestead will now lie as available under common law. Allen v. Monk,
505 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1974).
1. THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
Texas was the first of the states to enact a homestead law protecting the
family home from forced sale by creditors. Even before reaching statehood,
the Republic of Texas enacted the first homestead law in 1839,2 and a consti-
tutional guarantee of such an exemption was provided in 1845.3 Underlying
homestead law was the desire to provide a home where the family could live
which was secure against creditors' demands. 4
As the homestead doctrine did not exist at common law, its basis must
be found entirely in constitutional and statutory provisions. 5 In Texas, the
first such constitutional provision 6 was broad and denied all the family's
creditors the remedy of forced sale. The exemption was narrowed in 1869
to provide that those creditors who in some manner had contributed to the
existence of the family homestead might force a sale of that property.7 How-
ever, the creditors could recover only on the debts related to the property.8
1. Allen v. Monk, 498 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error granted.
2. Act of Jan. 26, 1839, [1839] Laws of the Republic of Texas 125, 2 H. GAM-
MEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 125 (1898); see 2 E. OAKES, SPEER'S MARrrAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS
§ 459, at 47 (4th ed. 1961); Thomas & Thomas, Interpretive Commentary to TEX.
CONsT. art. XVI, § 50 (1876).
3. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1845).
4. Andrews v. Security Nat'l Bank, 121 Tex. 409, 417, 50 S.W.2d 253, 256 (1932).
5. Gann v. Montgomery, 210 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948), er-
ror ref. n.r.e.
6. Tax. CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1845). The protected homestead property was de-
fined as either urban or rural. If urban, such property might be a "lot or lots in value
not to exceed $2,000." A rural homestead was limited to 200 acres.
7. TEx. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (1869).
8. Id. This article also provided that the valuation of urban homesteads was not
to include the value of improvements and was to be determined at the time of designa-
tion as the homestead.
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Subsequently, in the original provisions of the Texas Constitution of 1876,'
the place of business of the head of 'the family was included within the home-
stead protection.10 These provisions were amended in 197311 to provide
further that a single adult person, as well as a family,' 2 may acquire a home-
stead exemption.
II. CONVEYANCE OF THE HOMESTEAD
Since 1845 the Texas constitution has contained provisions which require
the wife's consent to any conveyance of the homestead by the husband.' 3
These provisions were designed to protect the wife, and thus the family, from
the loss of the homestead as a result of the husband's imprudent dealings.
A married man was prohibited from selling the homestead, even if it was
his separate property, "without the consent of the wife, given in a manner
as may be prescribed by law."'1 4  In 1973 this protection was extended to
require that neither spouse could sell or abandon the homestead without the
consent of the other. Consequently, both the husband and wife are now pro-
tected from the other spouse's imprudent dealings with the homestead. 15
Determination of the required form of the wife's consent was left to the
legislature, and the statutory law pertaining to this question can be divided
into two periods, prior to and after January 1, 1968. In the period prior
to 1968 the required consent was evidenced by the wife's joinder in the con-
veyance, signing of the deed, and separate acknowledgment of it. 16 No
acknowledgment could be taken from the wife without giving her a free
opportunity to retract her joinder in the deed. 17 These requirements were
9. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50-51 (1876).
10. In addition to protection from forced sales, in 1951 the homestead was exempted
from ad valorem taxation up to a maximum of $3000, assessed taxable value. TEX.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-a, 1-b (1951).
11. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, §§ 50-51. The new provisions also increased the maxi-
mum value of urban homestead property to $10,000. Article VIII, §§ 1-a and 1-b of
the Texas Constitution were also amended in 1973, but the tax exemption provided in
1951 was carried forward. See note 10 supra.
12. Traditionally, the homestead exemption was only available to a family unit. For
this purpose, a family consisted of an independent head, either single or married, with
persons dependent upon him. Tanton v. State Nat'l Bank, 125 Tex. 16, 79 S.W.2d 833
(1935); Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 19 S.W.2d 35 (1929); Speer &
Goodnight v. Sykes, 102 Tex. 451, 119 S.W. 86 (1909); see 2 E. OAKES, supra note 2,
§ 478.
13. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1845); TEX. CONsT. art. VII, § 22 (1861); TEX.
CONST. art. VII, § 22 (1866); TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (1869); TEX. CONsT. art.
XVI, § 50 (1876).
14. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876).
15. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
16. Ch. 39, § 1, [1897] Tex. Laws 40, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1094
(1898) (repealed 1967) (formerly TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1300 (1962)).
17. Act of April 30, 1846, [1846] Tex. Laws 156, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
1462 (1898) (repealed 1967). In addition to homestead conveyances, this statute, for-
merly TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6605 (1960), promulgated the required procedure
for all acknowledgments taken from married women. Its requirements were as follows:
No acknowledgment of a married woman to any conveyance or other in-
strument purporting to be executed by her shall be taken, unless she has
had the same shown to her, and then and there fully explained by the offi-
cer taking the acknowledgment on an examination privily and apart from
her husband; nor shall he certify to the same, unless she thereupon ac-
knowledges to such officer that the same is her act and deed, that she has
willingly signed the same, and that she wishes not to retract it.
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enacted by the legislature in order to protect married women from coercion
by their husbands with respect to the sale of the family homestead. 18
It was in this statutory climate that the leading case, Jones v. Gof,19 was
decided. In that case a husband and his wife had contracted to sell their
homestead. The contract was signed by both, with the wife separately
acknowledging the contract in the required manner.20 When she later re-
fused to convey, the court was unwilling to order specific performance of the
contract, and stated:
[T]he married woman's power to convey is derived from the statute,
and the authority to make executory contracts to convey the homestead
is not provided for by the statute and such contracts, therefore being
made without authority, fall under -the condemnation of [the constitu-
tion.] Such contracts as -to the married woman are void and not en-
forcible [sic].21
Further, the court emphasized that the wife had a statutory right to retract
her conveyance at the time of her acknowledgment and privy examination.
This power to defeat the conveyance was apparently controlling on -the ques-
tion of whether the courts might order specific performance of a contract to
convey a homestead. 22 Jones was consistently followed in Texas, and as a
result no contract for the sale of a homestead was specifically enforceable. 28
In 1921 the legislature enacted article 4618, the relevant part of which
read: "The homestead whether the separate property of the husband or wife,
or the community property of both shall not be disposed of except by the
joint conveyance of both the husband and the wife .... -24 Following the
passage of this statute, the cases continued to hold that there could be no
specific performance of a contract to convey the homestead. 25  One such
case, King v. Whatley,26 held that at any time before title had passed the
wife might repudiate the contract to convey, and in such a situation the courts
would not grant specific performance.
This view of executory contracts for the sale of a homestead was not with-
out its difficulties. In order to protect the rights of the prospective purchaser,
the courts established a rule making the husband liable for breach of the con-
tract to convey when his wife refused to convey according to the contract.
An illustration of the form of the required acknowledgment was given in the Act of
April 30, 1846, [18461 Tex. Laws 156, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 1462 (1898)(repealed 1967) (formerly TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6608 (1960)).
18. Cole v. Baumel, 62 Tex. 108, 111 (1884); Blume v. White, 111 S.W. 1066, 1068
(Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
19. 63 Tex. 248 (1885).
20. See note 17 supra.
21. 63 Tex. at 255.
22. Id. at 254, 255.
23. See, e.g., Collett v. Harris, 229 S.W. 885, 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1921); Fonda v. Colquitt, 165 S.W. 1195, 1196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1914); Ley
v. Hahn, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 208, 81 S.W. 354 (1904).
24. Ch. 130, § 1, [1921] Tex. Laws 251 (repealed 1967).
25. Williamson v. Lewis, 346 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1961); Al-
exander v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 346 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961);
Collett v. Harris, 229 S.W. 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1921); 2 E. OAKEs, supra
note 2, § 503.
26. 236 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951), error ref. n.r.e.
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The wife might repudiate the contract but be immune from any liability,
while the husband was liable in damages.27  The harshness of this rule was
mitigated by allowing the purchaser only his out-of-pocket expenses plus
interest. 28  When the vendor's breach was the result of bad faith, however,
damages for the loss of his bargain were granted to the purchaser. 29  Some-
what anomalous results occurred, and the courts often strained to find the
vendors in bad faith in order to compensate the purchaser.30
In 1963 the legislature adopted a number of measures in order to grant
new rights to married women. The wife gained "sole management, control,
and disposition" of her separate property,31 and, to enable her to contract,
sue, and be sued in her own name, a married woman was also given the
status of a single woman with respect to her separate property and special
community property.3 2 The husband retained general control and disposition
powers over the community property, including the wife's special community
property.33  Although these acts removed at least some of the disabilities of
coverture, especially in the areas of the wife's legal capacity to contract and
27. Goff v. Jones, 70 Tex. 572, 8 S.W. 525 (1888); Buehring v. Hudson, 219 S.W.2d
810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949), error ref.; Saulsbury v. Anderson, 39 S.W.2d
142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931), error dismissed; Fonda v. Colquitt, 165 S.W.
1195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1914). For a discussion of the issue on damages, see
Nelson v. Jenkins, 214 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948), error ref.; 2 E.
OAKES, supra note 2, § 580.
28. Nelson v. Jenkins, 214 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1948), error ref.;
Saulsbury v. Anderson, 39 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931), error dis-
missed; Finley v. Messer, 9 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927).
29. Buehring v. Hudson, 219 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1949), error
ref.; Menzies v. Blum, 218 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1949); Nelson v. Jen-
kins, 214 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948), error ref.
30. In Menzies v. Blum, 218 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1949), defend-
ants refused to convey because they had not found another home. The court called this
a "bad faith" refusal and allowed loss of bargain damages to the purchaser. Cf. Nelson
v. Jenkins, 214 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1948), where the court criticized
the allowing of loss of bargain damages, but allowed them because the defendants had
refused to convey, thinking the contract was a nullity.
31. Ch. 472, § 1, [1963] Tex. Laws 1188, amending ch. 219, § 1, [1961] Tex.
Laws 446 (now TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.21 (Supp. 1973)). In this provision, sep-
arate property is defined as that property which is owned or claimed by one spouse be-
fore marriage; property acquired after marriage by gift, devise, or descent is also sep-
arate property. Such property of one spouse may be real or personal. Although for
some time prior to 1963, married women had controlled their separate property, disposi-
tion of such property could only be made with the consent of the husband unless the
married woman elected to have sole management, control, and disposition of her sep-
arate property and filed the proper statement of her intent.
The legislature also repealed art. 1299, which had required the husband's joinder and
the wife's separate acknowledgment in any conveyance of the separate lands of the wife.
Ch. 473, § 1, [1963] Tex. Laws 1189, repealing ch. 40, § 1, [1897] Tex. Laws 41, 10
H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1095 (1898).
32. Ch. 472, § 6, [1963] TEX. LAws 1189, amending ch. 499, § 2, [1937] Tex.
Laws 1343 (subsequently amended 1967). Prior to 1963 this provision, formerly TEX.
REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4626 (1960), had required that a married woman apply for
feme sole status in order to be able to contract, sue, and be sued in her own name for
mercantile or trading purposes. The 1963 amendment automatically gave all married
women feme sole status.
33. Ch. 404, § 1, [1959] Tex. Laws 881 (repealed 1967). The wife's special com-
munity property consists of her personal earnings and the revenue from her separate
property. While these classes of property are community property, they are called the
wife's special community because of her power of management and control over them.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Supp. 1973).
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her power of disposition of her separate property,3 4 articles 1300,a5 4618,36
6605, 7 and 660838 were retained, so that a homestead still could not be al-
ienated except by joint conveyance of the spouses with the wife's separate
acknowledgment.39
Effective January 1, 1968, the legislature repealed the statutes which had
prescribed the separate acknowledgment4 0 and right to retract 4' for the mar-
ried woman. Further, the statutory requirement regarding conveyance of the
homestead, whether it be separate or community property, was amended 42
to provide that "neither spouse may sell, convey, or encumber the homestead
without the joinder of the other spouse. ' 43  In addition, the legislative pro-
visions which became effective at that time extended ,the power of a married
woman to manage, control, and dispose of community property. While the
amendments of 1963 had given the wife the contractual capacities of a single
woman with respect to her separate property and special community, and had
made that property liable for her debts,44 the Marital Property Act of 1967 4.
placed control and disposition powers over community property in the wife's
hands, thereby giving her an equal share in management of the community
property. Thus, the 1967 enactments, which were substantially carried for-
ward in the Texas Family Code, 46 by decreasing the husband's powers and
correspondingly increasing those of the wife,47 ended an era when the hus-
band maintained sole power of disposition of community property. Though
the question of whether specified performance would now lie for an executory
34. For a discussion of these statutory changes see Elston, Statutory Changes Af-fecting the Power of a Married Woman To Deal with Her Separate and Special Com-
munity Property, 28 TEX. B.J. 19 (1965); Smith, Legislative Note; 1963 Amendments
Affecting Married Women's Rights in Texas, 18 Sw. L.J. 70 (1964).
35. Ch. 39, § 1, [1897] Tex. Laws 40, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1094
(1898) (repealed 1967); see note 16 supra.
36. Ch. 130, § 1, [1921] Tex. Laws 251 (repealed 1967); see text accompanying
note 24 supra.
37. Act of April 30, 1846, [1846] Tex. Laws 156, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
1462 (1898) (repealed 1967); see note 17 supra and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. See notes 14-26 supra and accompanying text.
40. Ch. 309, § 6, [1967] Tex. Laws 741, repealing ch. 39, § 1, [1897] Tex. Laws
40, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1094 (1898); see note 16 supra and accompanying
text.
41. Ch. 309, § 6, [1967] Tex. Laws 741, repealing Act of April 30, 1846, [1846]
Tex. Laws 156, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1462 (1898); see note 17 supra and
accompanying text.
42. Ch. 309, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 735, 737, amending ch. 472, § 2, [1963] Tex.
Laws 1188 (carried forward as TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81-.86 (Supp. 1973)).
43. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (Supp. 1973).
44. Ch. 472, § 6, [1963] Tex. Laws 1189; see note 32 supra and accompanying text.
45. Ch. 309, 88 1-6, [1967] Tex. Laws 735-41, revising and amending chapters 2 and
3, tit. 75, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (1925), including former arts. 4613-27.
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02, 5.22, 5.23, 5.25, 5.61 (Supp. 1973). See 13
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 145 (Supp. 1974) for a table showing the derivation of these
statutes and their relation to sections of the Texas Family Code; and see McKnight, Re-
codification and Reform of the Law of Husband and Wife, 33 TEx. B.J. 34, 41-42
(1970).
47. Ch. 309, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 735, 738 (carried forward as TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 5.22 (Supp. 1973)). All the property which the wife would have owned if a
single person (including but not limited to special community property) was placed un-
der her sole management, control, and disposition. Further, if such property becomes
mixed or combined with that of the husband, the spouses share joint management powers
in the combined property. For an excellent discussion of control and management of
community property, see Comment, Section 5.22 of the Texas Family Code: Control
and Management of the Marital Estate, 27 Sw. L.J. 837 (1973).
1974]
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contract to convey a homestead had not been decided, at least one writer
expected the doctrine of Jones v. Go af 48 to be overruled. 49
III. ALLEN V. MONK
In Allen v. Monk the Texas Supreme Court interpreted the constitutional
proscription against the husband's conveyance of the homestead without the
consent of his wife "as prescribed by law." 50  The statutes, which were re-
pealed in 1967, dealing with the wife's separate acknowledgment, 51 as well as
the amendment of article 4618,52 concerning conveyance of the homestead,
apparently convinced the court that the required consent to a sale of the
homestead might be manifested by the wife's joinder in an executory written
contract for sale. 53 These changes terminated the wife's privilege of retract-
ing her consent to the sale of the homestead until a separate acknowledgment
of the deed was taken. The court concluded that this moved the only bar to
compelling specific performance of the contract to convey.54
The supreme court held that the Texas Constitution does not on its face
invalidate contracts to convey a homestead55 and declined to overrule Jones
v. Golf,5" agreeing that under the then existing statutes the only permissible
method of disposition of the homestead was by a present conveyance in
which husband and wife joined.5 7 The legislature's enactment in 1921
of article 4618, commanding that the homestead "shall not be disposed
of except by joint conveyance of both the husband and the wife,"58 sup-
48. 63 Tex. 248 (1885); see notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
49. Hudspeth, The Matrimonial Property Act of 1967-Six Areas of Change,
31 TEX. B.J. 477, 551 (1968).
50. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876). This provision, which was in effect at
the time of the making of the contract in this case, has since been amended effective
Nov. 6, 1973. The amended § 50 now states that the owner or claimant of the property
claimed as homestead may not "if married, sell or abandon the homestead without the
consent of the other spouse, given in such manner as may be prescribed by law." Such
an amendment was necessary, for under the prior constitutional provision and the re-
cently revised statutes giving a married woman the power to dispose of her separate
property without her husband's joinder, a married woman whose separate property was
the family homestead might sell that property without the husband's consent. On the
other hand, the constitution prohibited a married man from selling his separate property
homestead without his wife's consent.
51. Ch. 39, § 1, [1897] Tex. Laws 40, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1094
(1898) (repealed 1967); Act of April 30, 1846, [1846] Tex. Laws 156, 2 H. GAMMEL,
LAws OF TEXAS 1462 (1898) (repealed 1967); see notes 40-41 supra and accompanying
text.
52. Ch. 309, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 737, amending ch. 472, § 2, [1963] Tex. Laws
1188 (carried forward as TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §H 5.81-.86 (Supp. 1973)); see notes
42-43 supra and accompanying text.
53. 505 S.W.2d at 524-25.
54. Id. at 525.
55. Notwithstanding the language used by the supreme court in declaring a contract
to convey a homestead void and unenforceable, in Jones v. Goff, 63 Tex. 248 (1885),
it was held, in Goff v. Jones, 70 Tex. 572, 8 S.W. 525 (1888), that the husband's con-
tract was not invalid and could be enforced against him when the homestead character
of the property no longer existed. This case was a later suit by the same parties as
in Jones v. Golf, with the purchaser seeking damages for breach of contract (enforce-
ment of a title bond) rather than specific performance, which had already been denied.
56. 63 Tex. 248 (1885); see notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
57. 505 S.W.2d at 524-25; see notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
58. Ch. 130, § 1, [1921] Tex. Laws 251 (repealed 1967); see note 24 supra and
accompanying text.
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ported this view of the inadequacy of an executory contract to convey a
homestead, but the amendment of article 4618 in 1967 eliminated the re-
quirement of a joint conveyance. 59 The court interpreted the current stat-
utes as calling only for the spouses to join in any disposition of the home-
stead.60 The spouses might now dispose of at least 'the equitable title to the
homestead by joining in a contract for sale, as opposed to the previous re-
quirement of joinder in a deed.
The supreme court's decision in Allen v. Monk raises a number of ques-
tions. The court of civil appeals believed that article 4618 as amended in
196761 and as carried forward in section 5.81 of the Texas Family Code 62
was intended to extend to both spouses the right of preventing specific
performance.6 3  The appellant argued, however, and the Texas Supreme
Court apparently agreed, that this was not consistent with the trend of the
legislature's enactments in 1967 to remove the married woman's disabilities
of coverture and to make the spouses equal in responsibility for property
management and contractual obligations. It is difficult to believe that the
legislature intended a lessening of the husband's contractual ability in order
to achieve the desired equalization, since no language to that effect may be
found in the statutes and since, on the contrary, article 4625 as amended
in 196764 expressly states that all married persons "shall have the power and
capacity of a single person of full age, including the capacity to contract
. ... " This language strongly indicates an intent to extend contractual
ability rather than to limit it.
The supreme court did not take the same limited view of a sale of the
homestead as did the court of civil appeals, which held that a sale "when
applied to real property, can mean only a transfer of real estate by convey-
ance; for a contract to sell does not pass title."'65 In so holding, the court
of civil appeals disregarded section 5.8166 or, if not, held -that the legislature
included unnecessary and redundant wording by using the term "sell" along
with "convey." The supreme court instead read the statute67 in light of the
common law and took the legislature's enactment to imply that once joinder
59. Ch. 309, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 737, amending ch. 472, § 2, [1963] Tex. Laws
1188 (carried forward as TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. H8 5.81-.86 (Supp. 1973)); see notes
42-43 supra and accompanying text.
60. 505 S.W.2d at 525. The 1967 amendment of art. 4625 (carried forward as TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03 (Supp. 1973)), giving married women the full power to con-
tract, further impressed the court that specific performance of an executory contract to
convey a homestead will now lie against a married woman who signs such a contract,just as this remedy was always available, under common law, in contracts to convey real
property other than the homestead. See note 64 infra and accompanying text.
61. Ch. 309, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 737, amending ch. 472, § 2, [1963] Tex. Laws
1188 (carried forward as TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. 88 5.81-.85 (Supp. 1973)); see notes
42-43 supra and accompanying text.
62. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (Supp. 1973).
63. Allen v. Monk, 498 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973).
64. Ch. 309, § 6, [1967] Tex. Laws 741, amending ch. 79, § 1, [1848] Tex. Laws
77, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAws OF TExAs 77 (1898) (carried forward as TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 4.03 (Supp. 1973)).
65. 498 S.W.2d at 31.





of the spouses in the sale had been made, the statute was satisfied.68 Under
this view, later joinder in the conveyance to effect transfer of legal title as
called for in the sale contract may be compelled by the courts. The statutes
no longer require that the only method for alienating the homestead is by
joint conveyance of the spouses.6 9 The supreme court's interpretation is the
proper one since the Texas Constitution 0 and the statute7' have been satis-
fied. If the wife joins in the contract of sale there has been no sale "with-
out the consent of the wife."'7 2
The question remains whether the holding in Allen v. Monk furthers the
settled public policy of the state regarding homesteads. The basic purpose
of the homestead laws is to hold secure for the family a place for a home
and in this manner to serve the welfare of the state. 78  It cannot be said,
however, that homestead property is inalienable, but only that it must be dis-
posed of in strict compliance with the law. At the time of the making of
the contract, the wording of the constitution was that the homestead might
not be sold by the husband "without the consent of the wife."'7 4 The policy
underlying this provision has been described in the following manner: "The
object, purpose and intent of the [constitution] is to proteot the wife in the
homestead against the improvidence of the husband as well as the rapacity
of the creditor. ' 75 At 'the time of Jones v. Goff 76 it was felt necessary that
the wife's consent be shown by her joinder in any conveyance, her separate
acknowledgment of the conveyance, 77 and her statement that she did not
wish to retract the consent.78 These provisions were considered protective
of married women who might be coerced to join in a conveyance by their
husbands. While this protection may well have been needed in the nine-
teenth century and possibly even during the early part of this century, in
1967, when the statutes requiring these protective measures were amended
and repealed,7 9 they were anachronistic. Women had gained new rights and
responsibilities through progressive amendments to the state's laws in 196380
and again in 1967.81
The increasing sophistication of women has led to greater independence
for married women from their husbands, as well as their liberation in other
68. 505 S.W.2d at 526.
69. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
70. Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876).
71. TEx. FAM. CODE ANtN. § 5.81 (Supp. 1973).
72. Id.; see note 50 supra.
73. Andrews v. Security Nat'l Bank, 121 Tex. 409, 417, 50 S.W.2d 253, 256 (1932).
74. Tax. CO NST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876); see note 50 supra.
75. Jones v. Goff, 63 Tex. 248, 254 (1885).
76. 63 Tex. 248 (1885).
77. Ch. 39, § 1, [1897] Tex. Laws 40, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1094
(1898) (repealed 1967); see note 16 supra.
78. Act of April 30, 1846, [1846] Tex. Laws 156, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
1462 (1898); see note 17 supra.
79. Ch. 309, § 6, [1967] Tex. Laws 741, repealing ch. 39, § 1, [1897] Tex. Laws
40, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1094 (1898); Act of April 30, 1846, [1846] Tex.
Laws 156, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1462 (1898).
80. Ch. 472, §§ 1-7, [1963] Tex. Laws 1188-89; ch. 473, § 1, [1963] Tex. Laws
1189; see notes 31-39 supra.
81. Ch. 309, §§ 1-5, [1967] Tex. Laws 737-39; see notes 40-47 supra.
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areas. Outdated requirements such as the privy acknowledgment8 2 were
often thought by both spouses to be over protective. Because of the condi-
tions existing today, the holding of Allen v. Monk that a wife may bind her-
self through an executory contract to convey the homestead does not seem
to contravene the public policy of the state with respect to the inviolability
of the homestead, and because even greater progress for women can be fore-
seen in the future, it does not appear that this ruling will be one which will
lead to undesirable results in the years to come.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although faced with a question of statutory law on which the legislative
intent was far from clear, the court examined the trend of recent legislative
enactments and made an attempt to decide this point in a way which could
be reconciled with that trend. This decision is indicative of the willingness
by the Supreme Court of Texas to expand the rights and responsibilities of
married women unless the expansion is contrary to a statutory formulation.
But for this attitude, stare decisis might easily have influenced the court to
decide that, in the absence of clear legislative action to the contrary, such a
long established rule8 as the one that fell with this case should remain.
This view of a contract to convey a homestead is one which will create
greater uniformity in the law of conveyances. No longer need a purchaser
be surprised by the wife's refusal to join in a conveyance which she has con-
tracted to provide. The court's position here should also prevent speculation
by the vendors of a homestead with the obligation of a prospective purchaser
by ending the somewhat anomalous features of homestead conveyancing.
These aspects generally came about because the obligations of the various
parties were not mutual. The homestead buyer was obligated to perform
and even liable to face specific performance of his contract to purchase,8 4
but the vendor-wife could lawfully refuse to convey.85 The situation was
open to abuse, and all except the wife were liable to fall subject to inequit-
able circumstances. These facets of homestead conveyancing are now ended.
For the purpose of executory contracts to convey, the homestead, whether
community property or the separate property of one spouse, may now be
treated as any other property in which both spouses have an estate.
John C. Dacus
82. Act of April 30, 1846, [1846] Tex. Laws 156, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAwS OF
TEXAS 1462 (1898) (repealed 1967); see note 17 supra.
83. The decision in Jones v. Goff, 63 Tex. 248 (1885), had been consistently fol-
lowed in Texas to deny specific performance of executory contracts for sale of home-
stead property. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
84. It has been held that tender of deed by husband and wife satisfies the require-
ment of mutuality. Townsend v. Milliken, 294 S.W. 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1927), af 'd, 16 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929), holding approved.
85, See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
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Self-Help Repossession Under the UCC:
Presence or Absence of State Action?
Plaintiffs executed security agreements, in order to obtain bank loans, giv-
ing the defendant banks a security interest in their motor vehicles. After
plaintiffs failed to make -the required installment payments, defendants with-
out notice repossessed the vehicles through collection agencies. Plaintiffs
brought separate suits in their respective district courts asserting that Califor-
nia Commercial Code §,§ 9503 and 95041 violated due process of law in pro-
viding for repossession and disposition of collateral by a secured party without
prior notice and hearing. The plaintiffs invoked federal jurisdiction on the
grounds ,that summary repossession procedures constitute action taken "under
color of state law" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. 2
The district courts disagreed as to whether prejudgment self-help repos-
session of collateral involved sufficient state action to establish a federal cause
of action. Both cases were appealed and -they were joined for hearing before
the Ninth Circuit. Held: The State of California is not so significantly in-
volved in self-help repossession procedures undertaken by creditors under
sections 9503 and 9504 to permit the court to find the "state action" required
-to establish a federal cause of action. Adams v. Southern California First
National Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'g 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972); Hampton v. Bank of California, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
I. STATE ACTION
In order to state a cause of action involving a federal question under
,the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, it is necessary to find
some significant state involvement in the defendant's activities.4 Likewise,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for judicial remedy where one is deprived of any
1. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9503 (West 1964) provides in part: "Unless otherwise
agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In
taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be
done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action." CAL. COMM. CODE
§ 9504 (West 1964) provides in part:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of
any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commer-
cially reasonable preparation or processing . . . (2) If the security in-
terest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the
debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable
for any deficiency ....
Section 9503 is identical to the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503. Section 9504
does not differ from UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504 in any aspect relevant to
this case.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
4. The state action concept was developed in cases brought under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). While it is unclear that the same state
action test used in equal protection cases applies to due process cases, the courts which
have considered the question have applied the equal protection standard. See, e.g., Shir-
ley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Oller V. Bank of America, 342
F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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constitutional or Statutory right by any person acting "under color of state
law." 5  The conduct of private individuals, "however discriminatory or
wrongful," does not come within the purview of the sanctions of the four-
teenth amendment or section 1983 if the state has in no way involved itself
in the challenged activity.6
The modern doctrine of state action developed by the United States Sup-
reme Court began with the case of Shelley v. Kraemer.7 In that case the
Court found that judicial enforcement by state courts of covenants restricting
the use or occupancy of real property to persons of the white race was state
action and therefore violative of the fourteenth amendment.8 The doctrine
was further extended in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,9 where a
restaurant which leased space in a parking facility owned by a state agency
was held to have discriminated against blacks. State action was found even
though -the state had done nothing to encourage -the wrongful action. The
Supreme Court reasoned that the state had "elected to place its power, pro-
perty and prestige behind the admitted discrimination"'10 and by its inaction
had made itself a party to the refusal of service." The Court concluded
that the state had become a joint venturer in the enterprise and, therefore,
shared in the discriminatory policies of the private concern.
Reitman v. Mulkey 1 2 has been viewed by many commentators as the great-
est expansion of the state action doctrine. 13  In Reitman the Supreme Court
affirmed a decision of the California Supreme Court' 4 which had held uncon-
stitutional an amendment to the California Constitution prohibiting the state
from denying a private individual the right to sell property to whomever he
chose.', The Supreme Court accepted the California court's finding that the
effect of the amendment16 would be -to encourage and significantly involve
5. "Under color of state law" has been treated as the same thing as "state action"
required under the fourteenth amendment. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
794-95 n.7 (1966). But see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 210 (1970),
where Justice Brennan in his dissent indicates that, at least in some cases, "under color
of law" requires more involvement than "state action."
6. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shel-
ley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), discussed in Ming, Racial Restrictions
and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REV.
203 (1949).
8. Shelley involved a willing seller and a willing buyer. No discrimination oc-
curred until the court stepped in and enforced the restrictive covenant. Thus, the dis-
crimination originated with state action. Shelley did not say that if there was a willing
buyer but an unwilling seller that failure of a court to require the seller to sell was pro-
hibited state action. In such a case the discrimination is private and has already oc-
curred and the court is simply being neutral.
9. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-
A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1961).
10. 365 U.S. at 725.
11. Id.
12. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
13. See Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967).
14. 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
15. Prior to the amendment, the California Legislature had enacted legislation which
proscribed discrimination in real estate sales.
16. The California Supreme Court had gone to some length to assess the potential
impact of the amendment on the California environment. The Supreme Court expressly
approved this type of analysis saying that it is necessary for a court to "assess the poten-
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the state in private racial discrimination.' 7 Justice White's opinion for the
Court contains broad language to the effect that the state's encouraging rather
than commanding discrimination is sufficient to constitute state action.,
However, the Court has -not applied this reasoning to any case following
Reitman, 9 and many commentators feel the decision was actually on much
narrower grounds than the language of the decision indicates. 20
,In -two recent decisions the Supreme Court has been less willing to find
state action in private conduct. In Evans v. Abney2l a private citizen had
willed property to a city for use as a park on the condition that it be restricted
to whites. 22 Neither -the fact that state law at the time of the action permitted
such a restriction nor the fact that the Georgia Supreme Court had interpreted
the will as embodying a preference for termination 28 of the park rather than
its integration was found to constitute state action since the Court found
Georgia's trust laws to be "racially neutral. '24
In one of the most recent state action cases, Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 25 a
black guest of a club member was refused service at a private club's bar.
State action was asserted on the grounds that the Pennsylvania Liquor
Authority had issued a liquor license to the club. Despite the comprehensive
regulation of the club liquor sales and the limitation on the number of licenses
authorized, the Supreme Court held that the liquor regulations were not so
directly related to the discrimination as to constitute state involvement in the
actions of the club. 26  The Court in Moose Lodge declined to look at the
impact of the regulations and simply held that the statutes and regulations
governing the sale of liquor in no way overfly or covertly encouraged discrimi-
tial impact of official action in determining whether the state has significantly involved
itself with invidious discriminations." 387 U.S. at 380.
17. Id. at 375-76.
18. Id.
19. Although a subsequent case presented almost the identical issue as in Reitman,
Justice White, again writing for the majority, used much narrower language in finding
significant state action. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
20. See Black, supra note 13, at 82.
21. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
22. The Supreme Court in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), held that the
public character of the park "requires that it be treated as a public institution subject
to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who now has title under
state law." Id. at 302. On remand, the Georgia supreme court held that since the pur-
pose for which the trust was created had become impossible, that the trust had become
unenforceable and the property reverted to the estate. Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870,
148 S.E.2d 329 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
23. The Court distinguished Shelley v. Kraemer in Evans on the basis that in Shel-
ley state judicial action had affirmatively enforced a private scheme of discrimination,
while the effect of the Georgia decision eliminated all discrimination against Negroes
in the park by eliminating the park itself, the loss of the park being shared equally by
both white and Negro citizens. 396 U.S. at 445.
24. Id. at 444.
25. 407 U.S. 163 (1972); see The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV.
70-75 (1972).
26. Following the Reitman rationale, it would seem that in order to determine
whether a state is "significantly involved" in the challenged conduct it is necessary to
assess the potential impact of the action. Liquor licenses in Pennsylvania are issued on
a complex quota system. The majority opinion neglects to mention the fact that the
city in which the Moose Lodge was located has had its quota of licenses for many years.
407 U.S. at 182 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Blacks are thereby limited in the number
of places at which they may obtain liquor and since clubs may sell liquor for longer
hours than hotels and restaurants, the number of hours during which they can buy liquor
is also limited. Id. at 182 n.3,
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nation and therefore could not implicate the state in the discriminatory guest
policies. 27  Further, by refusing to recognize the substantial economic benefit
the state received from the licensing scheme, the Court substantially limited
the factors which can be relied on to show joint participation in a discrimina-
tory practice under the Burton rationale. Burton was distinguished on the
grounds that in that case the restaurant was located on public land. 28
While it is not clear what the Court would require today lo constitute
"significant state involvement" in private conduct, it would probably be nec-
essary that the factual setting of the case indicated that the state compelled,
participated in, or affirmatively fostered or encouraged the wrongful conduct.
II. CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Although constitutional and commercial law -have not often come into con-
flict, the Supreme Court has formulated a due process doctrine which forbids
states from recovering property from debtors who are allegedly in default
without providing judicial safeguards to protect their interests. In 1969 the
Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.29 held that prejudgment
garnishment procedures violated the due process requirements of the four-
teenth amendment. Three years later, in Fuentes v. Shevin,30 the Supreme
Court made it clear that the due process requirements of notice and hearing
must be accorded to a debtor before he is deprived of any significant property
interest by the state. 3 ' However, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant,32 the most recent
Supreme Court decision on the subject, casts serious doubt upon the Fuentes
requirement of notice and hearing before the taking of property. In that
case the Court held constitutional a Louisiana sequestration statute which
provided for no notice or hearing prior to the taking since the statute provided
extensive "judicial control" of -the -repossession process.38
The due process requirements apply, however, only -to the taking of pro-
27. This observation appears to be inconsistent with the language of Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971), in which the Court stated that discriminatory
or evil intent by the state is not controlling-the actual effect of the state action is the
determining factor under the fourteenth amendment.
28. 407 U.S. at 175.
29. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
30. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
31. Id. at 81-83; see Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor
Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355 (1973).
32. 94 S. Ct. 1895, 40 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1974).
33. The majority opinion distinguished Fuentes because the Florida and Pennsyl-
vania statutes held unconstitutional in that case permitted the seller to repossess under
a writ of replevin which was issued and carried out without judicial participation. The
writ of sequestration in Mitchell, however, was issued by a judge. Id. at 1904, 40 L.
Ed. 2d at 410. It is interesting to note, as did Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion,
that the provisions of the Louisiana statute are very similar to those held unconstitu-
tional in Fuentes and that outside Orleans Parish, Louisiana, in which the Mitchell case
arose, the writ is issued by a court clerk just as in Fuentes. Id. at 1912, 40 L. Ed. 2d
at 428.
Mr. Justice Powell in concurring expressed his view that the Court in Mitchell has
in fact withdrawn from the principles set forth in Fuentes so as to fairly overrule that
case. Id. at 1908, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 423.
Even under Mitchell's more limited due process requirements, however, it would seem
almost certain that the Uniform Commercial Code self-help provisions could not pass
constitutional muster, since no safeguards whatsoever exist to protect the interest of the
debtor before or after the taking of the property.
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perty by the state and not by private parties. Therefore, in -the self-help
creditors rights cases the applicability of the notice and hearing requirements
of due process depends on whether the exercise of the creditor's remedy in
issue can be attributed to the state so as to satisfy the state action require-
ment of the fourteenth amendment.
The first case challenging the constitutionality of the self-help repossession
provisions of the UCC was Adams v. Egley,34 wherein the federal district
court, relying on Reitman,35 held that the creditor's conduct in repossessing
motor vehicles was unconstitutional. Reitman was interpreted as holding
that where by law a state authorizes private conduct, there is fourteenth
amendment state action. The court found the repossession by the creditors
was authorized by the UCC provisions and was, therefore, within -the four-
teenth amendment's purview.36 However, the federal district court in Oller
v. Bank of America37 specifically disagreed with the Adams court's reliance
on Reitman, finding it inapplicable because it dealt with the area of racial
discrimination and because the "considerations fundamental to extending
federal jurisdiction to meet racial injustices are simply not present in the in-
stant case."38
In Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co."' a federal district court held
that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had "significantly encouraged" self-
help repossession by enacting sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the UCC. The
court reached this conclusion by giving substantial weight to the debtor's argu-
ment that the UCC provisions had changed the common law of Massachusetts
by permitting repossession without an express agreement between the parties.
Also, -the adoption of these provisions abolished the election of remedies doc-
trine by allowing the secured party both 'to repossess his collateral and bring
suit for a deficiency judgment. Other courts have reached the conclusion
that state action does not exist where sections 9-503 and 9-504 have merely
codified the common law right of repossession. 40
34. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. First Nat'l Bank,
492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
35. See notes 12-20 supra and accompanying text.
36. The Court stated:
These Commercial Code sections set forth a state policy, and the security
agreements upon which the instant actions rest, whose terms are author-
ized by the statute and which incorporate its provisions, are merely an em-
bodiment of that policy. It is therefore apparent that the acts of reposses-
sion were made 'under color of state law' as required .. . and that the
passage of §§ 9503 and 9504, which authorize such acts are sufficient
state action to raise a federal question.
338 F. Supp. at 618.
The presence of a reference to the UCC provisions in the security agreements was
noted by the court as an indication that the creditors were "persuaded or induced" to
include repossession clauses in the security agreement by the fact that repossession was
permitted by statute. Id. at 617.
37. 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
38. Id. at 23.
39. 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973).
40. In Messenger v. Sandy Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402, 406 (1972),
the court noted that, "codification of the practice of self-help repossession by the enact-
ment of § 9-503 cannot so give that practice color of state law as to take it out of the
private area and make it subject to the fourteenth amendment." See also Mayhugh v.
Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. I (W.D. Mo. 1973); Baker v. Keeble, 362 F. Supp.
355 (M.D. Ala. 1973). But see Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure and Deli-
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The majority of cases decided subsequent to Oiler and Adams have agreed
with the Oller rationale and have declined to find state action. However, few
of the courts on either side of the issue have thoroughly analyzed the state
involvement in light of the state action doctrine.
III. ADAMS V. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRST NATIONAL BANK
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Adams v. Southern California First National
Bank4' is the most complete analysis of the state action issue in any of the
self-help repossession cases to date.42  In Adams the court considered and
rejected every major argument by which action taken "under color of state
law" could be found in the self-help repossession of collateral. The debtors
in Adams sought to establish the presence of state action by relying basically
on two forms of alleged state involvement: first, the state's enactment of sec-
tions 9503 and 9504 of the California Commercial Code; and second, the
state's authorization and encouragement of the use of self-help repossessions
through its regulatory activities. 43  In support of the second argument, the
debtors pointed out the state's pervasive regulation of all aspects of motor
vehicle installment contract sales, 44 the regulation of the repossession process
itself, 45 the licensing of repossessors, 40 and the motor vehicle registration sys-
tem which provided for clearing the title of repossessed vehicles in the credi-
tor's name.
47
The debtors relied upon Reitman48 in arguing -that California deliberately
chose to follow a state policy of encouraging repossession and sale of collat-
eral without a prior judicial hearing and that the enactment of sections 9503
and 950449 was the embodiment of that policy. The Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that Reitman was not controlling and distinguished it on two grounds.
First, the court stated that in Reitman the state was involved to a far greater
degree in the challenged conduct "because -the proposed amendment had
been initiated for the purpose of authorizing what had before been expressly
prohibited, and if enacted would raise a barrier to the realization of a consti-
tutional goal."50 The court observed that in the self-help cases the enactment
of the provisions of the UCC did not reverse the law as it had been prior
ciency: A Journey to the Underworld and a Proposed Solution, 51 ORE. L. REV. 302,
330 n.16a (1972).
41. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
42. Since Adams was decided the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Cir-
cuits have handed down decisions in similar cases. Both the Eighth Circuit's opinion
in Bichel Optical Labs, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973),
and the Second Circuit's in Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974),
rely on the Adams decision in reaching the conclusion that self-help repossession does
not involve sufficient state action to raise a federal cause of action.
43. 492 F.2d at 331-32.
44. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-84.4 (West Supp. 1974).
45. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 28 (West 1971).
46. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7500-90 (West 1964), as amended, (West Supp.
1974).
47. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 5601, 9561 (West 1971).
48. 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see notes 12-20 supra and accompanying text.
49. CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 9503, 9504 (West 1964).
50. 492 F.2d at 332. Other courts have made similar statements. Johnson v. As-
sociates Fin. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Ill. 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp.
727 (D. Colo. 1972).
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-to the enactment of the Code.51 Further, the court firmly rejected the argu-
ment that by merely putting existing private remedies into statutory form,
,the state significantly involved itself in the private conduct.5 2  A contrary
result would have been tantamount to destroying the distinction between pri-
vate conduct and state action since almost every form of private conduct is
"authorized" and therefore "encouraged" by some state legislative, executive,
or judicial law.53
It is not entirely clear how important it was to -the court's decision that
the enactment of the UCC provisions did not change the common law of
California. 54 However, the court's reasoning that the mere enactment of a
statute authorizing certain conduct does not constitute state action would
seem to apply equally well regardless of whether the statute enlarges the
rights at common law or merely codifies those rights. The court's real dis-
tinction seems to be that the debtors in Adams were unable to show that
California's "purpose" in enacting sections 9503 and 9504 was to deprive
debtors of due process.55 It had been shown in Reitman that the intent of
-the state was to encourage racial discrimination.
The second factor which -the court stated as distinguishing Reitman was
that it did not believe that the resolution of the state action question in com-
mercial repossession cases ought ito be governed by a case involving racial
discrimination. 56  The court reasoned that while racial discrimination cases
evidenced a pattern of intentional indirect circumvention of constitutional
rights, the creditor's remedies were based on economically reasoned grounds
and had been the topic of extensive research and legislative investigation. 7
Other than this statement, the court gave no reason for its belief that state
involvement which would constitute state action in racial discrimination cases
is a much broader standard than the standard for finding state action in other
51. 492 F.2d at 332. Before the adoption of § 9503, California followed a rule al-
lowing parties to agree among themselves concerning their relative rights and duties in
secured transactions. Thus, repossession clauses can be found in early pre-code chattel
mortgages and conditional sales contracts. See Miller v. Stem, 34 Cal. 138 (1867);
Meyer v. Gorham, 5 Cal. 323 (1855). Usually these security agreements also provided
that the secured party was authorized to repossess the collateral upon default. See John-
son v. Kaeser, 196 Cal. 686, 239 P. 324 (1925); Holt Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, 109 Cal. 435,
42 P. 324 (1895).
52. 492 F.2d at 333.
53. See Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditor's Rights:
An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1096-1109 (1974).
54. At least one of the lower courts finding state action has relied on the fact that
the enactment of the UCC provisions changed the common law, Boland v. Essex County
Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); see note 39 supra and accompany-
ing text.
55. 492 F.2d at 333. Judge Byre in his dissent argued that the important thing is
not proving the subjective intent of the state, but rather to show that the effect of the
statute is that creditors now rely on the statute for the basic right to repossess. id. at
340.
56. Id. at 333. Several other cases have distinguished Reitman as a racial discrim-
ination case. E.g., Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973);
Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 721 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank,
351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
57. 492 F.2d at 333. See Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized
Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 116 (1973); Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession': An Economic Analysis,
47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82 (1973).
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types of cases. Although other federal courts have made this distinction,5"
only slight authority for this proposition appears in the decisions of the Sup-
reme Court.59 Despite the fourteenth amendment having a particular histori-
cal emphasis on preventing discriminatory treatment of blacks, the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses are aimed at limiting -the ability of states
to deal unfairly with their citizenry. Therefore, it would seem that the
threshold question of whether there is significant state action should be
governed by the same state action test regardless of the nature of the chal-
lenged conduct.
The second major basis upon which the debtors relied to establish state
action was the "pervasive" regulation by the state.60 In considering this argu-
ment the Ninth Circuit followed -the reasoning of Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis,6'1 concluding that since none of California's regulations addressed the
issue of when private repossession will be used or whether formal court action
will be preferred, -the state is not significantly involved in the creditor's deci-
sion to repossess.6 2
The court also examined a series of non-racial cases involving the utility
service termination procedures of privately owned utility companies which
were heavily regulated by the state. 63 The case which the court found con-
trolling was Lucas v. Wisconsin Power Co.,64 involving a utility company
which could terminate service -to a defaulting customer without entering the
customer's land. Because the challenged activity of terminating service could
be accomplished without the use of state authority, the court found no state
action taken under "color of law," stating that "affirmative support must be
significant, measured by its contribution to the effectiveness of defendant's
conduct... ."65
The debtors argued that not only was the repossession process heavily re-
gulated by the state, but the substance of the repossession activity was a ser-
vice which would otherwise be performed by the state. In the "public
function" cases, state action has been found where a service normally pro-
vided by the state was being provided by a private individual or organiza-
58. Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Bichel Optical Labs
v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank,
351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
59. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1971). This decision would seem
to support the argument that the Court is separating out the rights of racial minorities
for expansive constitutional protection.
60. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
61. 407 U.S. 163 (1972); see notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
62. 492 F.2d at 334.
63. The court felt these cases were particularly important since they dealt with the
state action concept in a non-racial discrimination area.
64. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
65. Id. at 656; cf. Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973),
where the Sixth Circuit concluded that since virtually every aspect of the utility com-
pany's operation was subject to regulation by the state or city and the state had given
powers to the utility company not usually possessed by non-governmental authorities,
that the state must be recognized as a joint participant with the company. The distin-
guishing factor between Adams and Palmer seems to be that in Palmer the company
had been granted authority normally reserved to the state-the power to enter private
land. The Adams court found no such extraordinary grant of authority to the creditors
which contributed to the effectiveness of their conduct.
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tion.66 The debtors particularly relied on 'the approach taken by the Fifth
Circuit in Hall v. Garson. 7  In that case the court held that a landlord's
seizure of a tenant's property pursuant to authority given by a Texas statute6 s
constituted action taken "under color of law" because the act of entering into
another's home and seizing his property was the type of act characteristically
performed by the state.69  The Adams court found Hall distinguishable be-
cause in Hall the Texas statute vested the landlord with authority which had
historically been a function of the state, while repossession has not tradition-
ally been a state function, but rather a historically private remedy. 70
It is debatable, however, whether .the test of a "public function" is whether
it was historically performed by the state or whether the nature of the activity
is such that it falls within the type of conduct benefiting the public which
the state was created to perform. A strong argument can be made that con-
flict resolution which is binding on the parties is a power belonging solely
to the state and, :therefore, any power to settle conflicting claims to prop-
erty possessed by virtue of statute or common law is power delegated by the
state.71  Self-help repossession is certainly a form of settling conflicting
claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The debtors in 'the self-help cases have relied upon a broad range of state
action theories which the Ninth Circuit clearly rejected in Adams. Since the
Second and Eighth Circuits have ruled in accord with Adams72 there is little
room left to argue for a finding of state action in subsequent cases.
However, -the Ninth Circuit may be fairly criticized for its failure to con-
sider the nature of the repossession activity in conjunction with the fact that
the activity is heavily regulated. It is a fair inference to make from the state
action cases that -the more heavily regulated the activity, the more likely it
is that the regulated enterprise is performing a function of the state. This
would appear to be the one argument to which the Adams decision would
be vulnerable to attack in another court.
Implicit in the Adams decision is a weighing of the interests involved and
the finding that repossession is a respectable and economically desirable
66. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private trustees of a park
found to be performing public function); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (state
action found because Texas county political group performed state function in operating
primary election); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Democratic Party held
agent of state in primary elections).
67. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
68. Ch. 686, [1969] Tex. Laws 2008 (repealed 1973).
69. 430 F.2d at 439.
70. 492 F.2d at 336. There seems to be some disagreement as to whether or not
self-help repossession is a historically sound principle of the common law. See Gibbs
v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAw 574-78 (2d ed. 1898); 3 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL
LIABILITY 278-88 (1906).
71. See Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 745 (2d Cir. 1974) (Kaufman,
J., dissenting).
72. Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Bichel Optical Labs,
Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973).
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method of private ordering. For this reason the Ninth Circuit felt that there
was no interest to be served in further expanding the state action doctrine.
Kathlyn Graves Farrar
Winters v. Cook: Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Waiver Doctrine
Winters, an eighteen-year-old black male, was indicted by the Grand Jury
of Holmes County, Mississippi on the charge of murder. Winters had been
slapped by Branch, a middle-aged white man, when Winters attempted to talk
with a black girl employed in Branch's tavern. Infuriated by the slap, Win-
ters left the tavern, obtained a shotgun, returned, and killed Branch. On
the advice of counsel, Winters pleaded guilty to murder in order to avoid the
risk of the death penalty. Unknown to Winters, blacks had been excluded
from the grand jury list on a systematic basis.' Winters' counsel, aware of
the discriminatory practice, 2 had used his refusal to raise the challenge to the
racial composition of the grand jury as bargaining leverage to obtain the life
sentence for Winters. Subsequent to his guilty plea, Winters petitioned for
habeas corpus relief, initially in the state courts, 3 and later in the federal
court,4 alleging that his plea of guilty was not "knowingly and intelligently"
entered. First, he was unaware of his right to challenge the exclusion of
blacks from the jury list, and secondly, he was denied -the effective assistance
of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment. 5 A three-judge panel orig-
nally agreed with Winters' contentions, 6 but a petition for rehearing en banc
was granted. Held, District Court affirmed: Absent exceptional circum-
stances, which do not include claims of racial discrimination in grand jury
selection procedures, the actions of counsel are imputed to his client, -and a
1. Holmes County, Mississippi was approximately 70% black and 30% white.
Winters' petition for relief alleged that no blacks or only a very small percentage had
ever been on the jury list. Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 183 (5th Cir. 1973) (Rives,
J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 184 n.4, quoting from the language of the lower court decision in Winters
v. Cook, 333 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Miss. 1971), which stated: ". . . Mr. Cawley was
aware of petitioner's right to attack the exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury which
indicted him and from the petit jury impaneled for the October term of the Circuit Court
of Holmes County ....... Id. at 1038.
3. Winters' initial challenge was made in the state courts of Mississippi. The chal-
lenge was held to be without merit on the ground that Winters' counsel had waived the
right to contest the grand jury selection process. The state court did not consider the
adequacy of representation that Winters received. Winters v. State, 244 So. 2d 1 (Miss.
1971).
4. Winters federal petition was filed in the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Mississippi, but again it was held that the actions of counsel waived Winters'
right to challenge his plea. Winters v. Cook, 333 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
See also Winters v. Cook, 466 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1973).
5. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
6. Winters v. Cook, 466 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1973).
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waiver by the attorney will bind the client. Furthermore, Winters' plea of
guilty foreclosed an attack on the grand jury selection process on constitu-
tional grounds. Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER
The classic definition of the doctrine of waiver of a constitutional right was
first enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst.7 In Johnson the defendant was charged
with counterfeiting money. The defendant did not request the assistance of
counsel and proceeded to conduct a defense pro se, but was convicted. He
later attacked the conviction in federal court claiming that he was denied the
assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that John-
son's failure to make a timely request constituted a waiver of his right to
counsel and held that "a waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege."" Since Johnson was not
aware of -his right to counsel, his acts could not have constituted a knowing
and intelligent waiver.9
In Fay v. Noia' ° the Supreme Court retreated somewhat from the broad
doctrine promulgated in Johnson. Although it reiterated its dependence
upon the standards set out in Johnson, the Court also limited the scope of
the waiver doctrine 'by implying that procedural rights were capable of classi-
fication into those which required personal participation, and those that could
,be waived by defendant's counsel." The Court took judicial notice of the
fact that legitimate reasons might exist for a defendant's waiver of all or part
of his constitutional guarantees. It recognized that a defendant could use
a constitutional challenge as a bargaining tool so as to achieve some tactical
advantage,' 2 and such use would still fall within the Johnson doctrine of a
knowing and intelligent waiver. 13
7. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
8. Id. at 464. The Court relied upon language in Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389, 393 (1937), which stated that "[c]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental rights . . ." and upon Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937), where it stated that courts "do not presume ac-
quiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
9. 304 U.S. at 464.
10. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In Fay the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus
claiming that he had been denied his rights under the fourteenth amendment because
he was convicted on the basis of a coerced confession. The Court held that the defend-
ant had waived his right to attack the validity of the confession since he had failed to
raise the issue in the state court when he had full opportunity to do so.
11. The Court, however, did not define those rights that could be waived by the at-
torney. The opinion intimated that as long as the defendant was able to make the con-
trolling choice, in the sense that he was able to exercise his rights in the adjudication
process, the standards of Johnson would be satisfied. The Court further stated that
"[a] choice made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not automatic-
ally bar relief." Id. at 439.
12. The Court held:
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel or other-
wise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to
vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tac-
tical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate
by-passing of state procedures, then it is open to the federal court on ha-
beas to deny him all relief if the state courts refused to entertain his fed-





Following its decision in Fay, the Court, in Henry v. Mississippi,14 reaf-
firmed its intention to hold some defendants to their strategic choices. The
Court held that where a state procedural mechanism existed in the trial
process that allowed the assertion of protected rights, a deliberate by-pass by
counsel would bind the client, even though the decision was made without
the knowledge of the client.15 The decision of the Court gave express
recognition to the notion of a dual concept of waiver. Those rights that were
waived in the trial process without the knowledge of the defendant were bind-
ing absent a showing of "exceptional circumstances."' 6
It is well settled that a plea of guilty may constitute a waiver of several fund-
amental constitutional rights. A plea of guilty will, for example, result in
a waiver of a defendant's right to a trial by jury,17 his right to appeal,' his
privilege against self-incrimination,' 9 and his right to confront witnesses.2 0
Courts have consistently held that a defendant's waiver by a plea of guilty
must still meet the standards set out in Johnson; that is, a defendant's by-pass
of state procedures must have been made "voluntarily after proper advice
with full understanding of the consequences." '2' The essential element of the
Johnson test is the knowledge that the defendant possesses concerning all the
consequences of his plea. The object of the test is to ensure that the choice is
truly voluntary, and it appears to rest upon whether or not the defendant
was able to make a rational choice22 from the totality of the circumstances. 23
These circumstances would include all the events leading -up to the entry of
the plea, such as inducements through plea bargaining, advice of counsel,
gravity of the offense and ultimate punishment, and also 'a determination of
14. 379 U.S. 443 (1965). In Henry counsel failed to make a timely objection to
the introduction of evidence obtained through an illegal search. The evidence ultimately
resulted in the defendant's conviction. The trial record indicated that the attorney delib-
erately by-passed the objection to the introduction of the evidence, hoping to attack it
on appeal in the federal courts.
15. Id. at 451.
16. The court relied upon the "exceptional circumstances" language used in Whitus
v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964), which is dis-
cussed in note 38 infra and accompanying text. In Henry the Court stated: "Trial
strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where
the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional
claims." 397 U.S. at 451. The courts have never specifically defined "exceptional cir-
cumstances," but generally, they refer to those rights which guarantee the integrity of
the criminal trial process itself, such as the right to a trial by jury, right to counsel,
and the privilege against self-incrimination. In reality, these amount to threshold re-
quirements that must be met in order to guarantee the due process requirements of the
United States Constitution in criminal prosecutions. Cf. notes 17-20, 30 infra.
17. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
18. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
19. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In this case, the Court expressly
held that a plea of guilty waived a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, right
to a trial by jury, and right to confront witnesses against him.
21. Shelton v. United States, 292 F.2d 346, 347 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 877 (1962), quoting from Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
22. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. RE.,. 1387, 1398
(1970); see, e.g., Gilmore v. California, 364 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1966). Rational choice
has not meant that a criminal defendant had the option of choosing between a good and
bad set of alternatives, but only that the criminal defendant was aware of the existence
of alternatives, notwithstanding the fact that all of them may have been less than de-
sirable.




the presence of coercive elements and intimidation. 24 The Supreme Court,
in Brady v. United States,25 affirmed the concept of the traditional test which
looks to the totality of the circumstances, 26 and also indicated that the
requirement for knowledge did not dictate that every fact must be known
to the defendant. Further, since the plea is a separate and intervening act,
the plea will waive any minor irregularities in the process. 27
II. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
The courts have long recognized the important role assumed by an
attorney in the criminal process. In Powell v. Alabama28 the black defen-
dants, charged with a capital offense of rape, were not permitted the
assistance of counsel. The Court reversed their conviction on the ground that
due process required the assistance of counsel under these circumstances. 2
Subsequent to the decision in Powell, the courts 'have realized that a lay per-
son, no matter how intelligent he may be, is not capable of conducting his
own defense.80  The result has been that defendants have been granted the
right to counsel in all felony prosecutions, 31 and in misdemeanor prosecutions
involving potential imprisonment.3 2
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a defendant's right to
counsel would 'be an empty right if it did not include the right to effective
assistance of counsel, and that the lack of such assistance violates due process
requirements.3 3  What the Court has not defined, however, is the level of
24. 373 U.S. at 513. See also Comment, Criminal Procedure-Guilty Pleas, 47
DENV. L.J. 540 (1970).
25. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). See also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
26. In Brady the Court rejected petitioner's argument that fear of the death penalty
was inherently coercive, thereby rendering his guilty plea involuntary. The petitioner
had relied upon United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), which declared unconsti-
tutional the penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)
(1970). The Act provided for the death penalty if the defendant exercised his right
to a trial by jury while providing for a maximum of life imprisonment if the defendant
entered a guilty plea. The Court stated that a motivation to plead guilty so as to avoid
the death penalty was not alone sufficient to set aside the plea, so long as it was know-
ingly and intelligently entered.
27. See Comment, supra note 24.
28. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
29. The Court stated: "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." Id. at 68-69.
30. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Justice Black, delivering the opin-
ion of the Court, quoted Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932):
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of the law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad . . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he have a perfect one. . . . Without it [assistance
of counsel], though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence,
Id. at 344-46.
31. 372 U.S. at 335.
32. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
33. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955). Like Winters, the attack was on an im-
properly constituted grand jury which had systematically excluded blacks. The Court
held that: "The effective assistance of counsel in such a case is a constitutional require-
ment of due process which no member of the union may disregard." Id. at 90. See
also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942), in which the Court held that a
failure by courts to insure the appointment of effective counsel would be a denial of
due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The Court reasoned that
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competence required of an attorney in the criminal trial process . 4 This lack
of an identifiable standard has become a more acute problem under the hold-
ings of the Court in Fay and Henry. The criminal defendant, not normally
versed in criminal procedure, must rely upon the advice of counsel in
determining whether to pursue or to waive available avenues of defense.
The right to effective assistance of counsel is one of a criminal defendant's
most fundamental rights because "it affects his ability to assert other rights
he may have."135
Under Fay, and more importantly, under Henry, a criminal defendant may
attack the denial of a right waived ,by counsel without the defendant's
knowledge only upon the showing of exceptional circumstances. 36  An ex-
ample of the exceptional circumstances doctrine set forth in Henry was the
issue of racial discrimination, and the resultant impact of this discrimination
upon the attorney-client relationship, as between a black defendant and his
white attorney. For many years, it was common practice for attorneys in
the South to decline to challenge the racial composition of the jury systems,
and the Fifth Circuit has taken judicial notice of that fact. 37  In Whitus v.
Balkcom 38 the Fifth Circuit described the dilemma faced by black defendants
charged with crimes in racially segregated and polarized communities. The
defendants in this case had to choose either to challenge the jury selection
process, thereby incurring the wrath of an all-white jury system, or to suffer
deprivation of a trial by an impartially selected jury of their peers. 39 In
Whitus the defendants attacked their conviction on the grounds that blacks
were excluded from both the grand and petit juries which had indicted and
convicted them. 40 The attorneys for the defendants were fully cognizant of
this policy but did not advise the defendants of the practice or of their right
to challenge it. The court held that a failure to object to the exclusion of
blacks did not amount to a waiver by the defendants since they made "no
ineffective counsel would prevent a criminal defendant from obtaining a fair hearing on
the merits, and thereby constitute a denial of due process. See also Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
34. The only real standard of competency is discussed in McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759 (1970). The standard is phrased in the negative, only stating what does
not constitute ineffective counsel. See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
35. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8(1956).
36. 379 U.S. at 451.
37. In United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 82 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 850 (1959), the court, through Judge Rives stated: "As judges of a
Circuit comprising six states of the deep South, we think it is our duty to take judicial
notice that lawyers residing in many southern jurisdictions rarely, almost to the point
of never, raise the issue of systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries."
38. 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
39. The court, quoting the majority opinion in Fay, describes this dilemma as "the
grisly, hard, Hobson's choice the state puts to Negro defendants when it systematically
excludes Negroes from juries; white defendants are not subjected to this burden." Id.
at 499, quoting from 372 U.S. at 440.
40. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss exhaustively the constitutional his-
tory of the Supreme Court's consideration of systematic exclusion of blacks from grandjuries. However, it should be noted that the Court, for almost one hundred years, has
held that this amounts to a denial of due process and equal protection of the law. See,
e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463(1947); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587(1935); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442
(1900); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1889).
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deliberate, meaningful waiver of their objection to systematic exclusion of
Negroes from the juries."' 41 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized
the peculiar problems faced by black defendants, and implied that the courts
in the Fifth Circuit would scrutinize more closely the actions of counsel who
represent blacks, as opposed to whites.
Two recent cases have emphasized the role of the attorney in the waiver
process. In McMann v. Richardson42 the defendant pleaded guilty to mur-
der and later attacked his conviction by seeking a writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because he
was advised ,by his attorney to plead guilty even though the bulk of evidence
against 'him was inadmissible. The Court stated that:
Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when
motivated by a confession erroneously thought inadmissible in evidence
depends as an initial matter, not whether a court would retrospectively
consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.43
The Court in McMann refused to define a standard of competence required
of attorneys in criminal representation; instead, it stated simply that it would
not use hindsight to judge tactics and strategy of counsel that might be ques-
tionable from a legal standpoint.44 In 1973 the Court, in Tollett v. Hender-
son,45 reinforced its holdings in Brady and McMann by again emphasizing the
significance of a plea of guilty. This plea amounts to an intervening circum-
stance that may cure irregularities in the criminal process that preceded it.46
Under the ruling of the Court, a defendant may only attack a plea of guilty
by showing that it was not voluntarily and intelligently made. In judging
the caliber of advice the defendant received, the Court will not consider
whether the advice was right or wrong, but only whether that advice was
within the range of competence set forth in McMann.47
III. WINTERS V. COOK
In Winters v. Cook 48 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, en banc, held that racial discrimination in grand jury selection pro-
cedures did not constitute one of the exceptional circumstances under Henry49
41. 333 F.2d at 509.
42. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
43. Id. at 770-71.
44. The Court held: "A defendant's plea of guilty based upon reasonably compe-
tent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have
misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession." Id. at 770.
45. 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In Tollett neither the defendant nor his counsel knew
of the systematic exclusion of blacks from the grand jury. Petitioner raised the attack
upon his guilty plea twenty-five years after it was made.
46. "A guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it
in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open
court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not there-
after raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that oc-
curred prior to the entry of the plea." Id. at 267.
47. Id.
48. 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973).
49. See note 16 supra.
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even though the attorney waived the challenge to the selection process with-
out the knowledge and acquiescence of the defendant. 50 The court rested
its opinion on two separate grounds. First, the defendant was precluded from
asserting his challenge to the racial composition of the grand jury by the
waiver of his counsel, even though a grand jury selection process that
excludes blacks had long been held to be a denial of due process of law.51
Second, the court stated that Winters' plea of guilty operated as a break in
the chain of events, and, as such, foreclosed his challenge to all prior
procedural irregularities. 52 Winters' main contention on appeal was that his
attorney had failed to advise him of the racial composition of the grand jury.
This failure to advise prevented him from exercising a knowing and intelli-
gent choice, and this alone rendered the assistance of counsel inadequate.
In response to this, the court reiterated the position taken by the Supreme
Court that an attorney could waive the rights of the accused in the name
of trial strategy, and, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, the de-
fendant was bound by the acts of his counsel.5 3 The fact that the defendant
in Winters was not advised of the possibility of a constitutional objection to
the racial composition of the grand jury would not be enough to bring his
challenge within the doctrine outlined in Henry.5 4
The viability of the waiver by counsel rests upon his "good faith" attempts
to represent his client,5 5 and the court placed a great deal of emphasis on
the fact that Winters was able to avoid the death penalty because of his attor-
ney's actions. 56 As to the failure to advise, the court stated: "We refuse
to enlarge the attorney's duty to include the responsibility to inform the de-
fendant of every possible constitutional claim."5" Judge Clark, who delivered
the opinion of the court, noted that an enlargement of -the responsibility of
the attorney would have a debilitating effect on the trial process, since it
would entail lengthy delays by forcing the judiciary to inquire into the de-
fendant's knowledge of every constitutional claim. 58 The court set the stand-
ard of review by stating that in order for the conviction to be set aside the
defendant must show fraud, gross incompetence or neglect on the part of the
50. 489 F.2d at 177.
51. See cases cited note 40 supra.
52. The court described the plea of guilty as a "complete bar to habeas relief
grounded on grand jury discrimination." 489 F.2d at 180.
53. Id. The court relied upon the Supreme Court holdings in Fay and Henry. See
notes 11 and 15 supra and accompanying text.
54. See note 14 supra.
55. 489 F.2d at 176.
.56. The plea bargain between the defense attorney and prosecutor is emphasized by
the majority: "Winters exchange of a lethal shotgun blast for a prior verbal insult and
a fisticuff makes his lawyer's trade of a term of imprisonment which could be as short
as ten years for the chance to gamble on the death sentence look like a sure thing."
Id. at 183. The court ignores the reasonable analysis of the facts discussed by Judge
Rives in his dissenting opinion which postulated that, if a white defendant had been ex-
changed for Winters, a likely possibility would have existed that Winters would have
at most been charged and convicted of manslaughter. The racial attitudes in the com-
munity did not fit the "ideal" that the majority readily accepted. Id. at 184.
57. Id. at 177.
58. The court said that "it would be a futile command to require that a trial judge
continually satisfy himself that the defendant was fully informed as to, and in complete




attorney, or that the right waived was so fundamental that only the defendant
could waive it.59 It was held that Winters satisfied none of these require-
ments since the range of competence demanded of an attorney, as promul-
gated in McMann,6 0 was fully satisfied. The attorney, in waiving the objec-
tion to grand jury composition, had a "conscientious consideration of that
course of action which would be best for his client." 61 Following the reason-
ing set out in Tollett,62 the court further stated that the rights which were
waived here by the acts of counsel were not so fundamental that Winters had
to participate personally in the waiver. 63 Defendant's knowledge of every
constitutional right was not required to make a plea of guilty a knowing and
intelligent one,6 4 and, since the right in question was not fundamental, the
only requirement was that the scope of advice fall within the ambit of
McMann, that of reasonably competent counsel.65
In dissenting opinions, Judges Rives66 and Godbold 67 argued that the
Winters case was a classic example of racial discrimination, and that Winters
was indicted for murder primarily because he was black. Using different
reasoning, they both criticized the majority's method of rationalizing away
the Fifth Circuit's prior position of closely watching the relationships of white
attorneys and black defendants. Judge Rives argued that the policy should
still remain in effect, using Winters as a classic example to support this
view.68 Judge Godbold argued that overturning past policy affecting six
states on the basis of one isolated case was not sound judicial policy.6 9
The opinion of the majority in Winters seemingly departed from its prior
position of taking judicial notice of racial problems peculiar to the Fifth Cir-
cuit. 70 In addition, the reasoning process utilized by the majority in Winters
was somewhat circular. While it dismissed outright the essence of Winters'
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it then said that since Winters of-
fered no evidence to show ineffective assistance of counsel, the court could
only conclude that the actions of Winters' counsel came within the standards
of McMann. Similarly, the court refused to assail the integrity of attorneys
59. Id. at 178.
60. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
61. 489 F.2d at 180.
62. See note 45 supra.
63. 489 F.2d at 179. The court reasoned that since case precedent did not describe
the right to an impartially selected grand jury as so fundamental that a defendant must
personally participate in its waiver, it obviously was not fundamental, no matter what
the circumstances. Id. at 179-80.
64. The court stated that: "Where the attorney reached a more than arguably cor-
rect decision involving many complicated and uncertain variables, we will not impose
a rule requiring that he inform his client as to the precise nature of each variable. A
lawyer does not have to conduct a course in constitutional law for his client to validly
discharge his position of trust." Id. at 181.
65. See note 44 supra.
66. 489 F.2d at 183.
67. Id. at 190.
68. Id. at 188.
69. Id. at 191.
70. The court, as a matter of practice, overruled the position previously taken in
Goldsby: "The majority of the court en banc now announces that it does not consider
such breach of trust by counsel to be so prevalent in any jurisdiction of this circuit that
this court should, in the absence of proof, place all or even some lawyers in this circuit
under the cloud of such an accusation." Id. at 178.
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practicing with the Fifth Circuit without clear evidence of impropriety.7 1
The concept of waiver implies that waiver be made knowingly and intel-
ligently a concept still viable under Johnson v. Zerbst and subsequent deci-
sions. Assuming arguendo that objections to the composition of a grand jury
can be waived without the participation of the accused in some circumstances,
the majority failed to distinguish on its facts the instant case from Tollett and
Brady, and to apply correctly the standard of competency set out in McMann.
Here, the entire bargaining transaction between Winters' attorney and the
prosecutor centered on the discriminatory selection process of the grand jury.
This bargaining issue did not consist of a corollary constitutional issue which
-the majority thought an attorney should not be burdened with in advising
his client. Unlike Tollett, the attorney in Winters knew of the practice of
racial exclusion, and the use of this for leverage in his defense function was
in fact the only strategic decision made by the attorney. The majority cites
Whitus for the proposition that an objection to grand jury composition is not
crucial to the rights of the accused, while ignoring the fact that in Whitus
the defendants had a jury trial, and once the issue was before a petit jury,
the role of the grand jury was necessarily diminished. In -the instant case,
the grand jury played a much more important role. -It was the only link in
the criminal process that Winters passed through from arrest to plea. The
argument of the 'majority that Winters' counsel satisfied the standards of
competency set out in McMann is incorrect for two reasons. First, Winters
attorney did not advise his client of the very essence of his defense.
MoMann gave the attorney some leeway for error, but it did not confer a
blanket of immunity upon him. The criminal defendant still has the right
to challenge the quality of the representation he received, and the Court gave
express recognition to the right to effective assistance of counsel. Second,
McMann stands for the proposition that a court will not retrospectively
question the tactics of the attorney if he has misjudged the legal question
involved, or failed to anticipate a new trend in the law.72 However, no such
case existed in Winters. The attorney in Winters was aware of the long
established legal doctrine that prohibited discrimination in grand jury selec-
tion, and a question of second guessing new policy was never applicable.
The Court based its holding on the theory that the law is complex and in
a state of constant flux, and to penalize the acts of an attorney, through the
benefit of hindsight, would be most unfair, and would at the least raise the
spectre of endless appeals. However, the Fifth Circuit significantly departs
from its prior position of allowing the trial courts discretion in gauging the
effectiveness of counsel. 73 Other circuits have decided the issues of compe-
tency on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that the solution to such is very
71. Id.
72. 397 U.S. at 771.
73. In Colson v. Smith, 438 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1971), the court, relying upon Mc-
Mann, upheld a petitioner's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
when the attorney coerced the defendant into waiving a challenge to the grand jury com-
position by pleading guilty. The court said: "We do not have before us a case of 'rea-
sonably competent' advice which, with the benefit of hindsight, turned out to be mis-
taken." Id. at 1081.
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complex and not capable of easy resolution. 74 Winters holds that the compe-
tency of counsel cannot be attacked without a showing of gross incompetence
or neglect.
One could say that -the decision of the court in Winters is applicable only
to cases adjudicated by pleas of guilt. However, the necessity of effective
assistance of counsel is no less diminished because a defendant pleads guilty
than when he chooses to contest the charges made against him, and, in fact,
the need is probably greater since a defendant's rights are waived by the plea
of guilty. The decision in the instant case is not justified by McMann nor
rationalized by Tollett.
The doctrine of waiver has been troublesome to courts over the last thirty-
five years, mainly because of the competing interests involved in the contro-
versy. The courts have been attempting to accommodate the criminal
defendant's right to equal protection and due process of law while at the same
time satisfying the need of the criminal justice system for finality of judg-
ments and judicial economy. 75  The accommodation amounts to a balancing
of interests between these two separate and sometimes mutually exclusive
concepts, with the waiver doctrine falling somewhere between the two in an
ill defined area. The majority opinion in Winters places great emphasis on
Winters' guilty plea, with the result that the court is able to ",balance away"
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 76 Unfortunately, -the court
never really considered -the logic of its reasoning, for implicit in its analysis
is that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is not absolute.
A sliding scale now appears to exist whereby defendants are subject to differ-
ing definitions of ineffective assistance of counsel. Those who plead guilty
must demonstrate gross incompetence or neglect, while those who obtain con-
victions -through the trial process must only show incompetence.77 In
practical terms, the court appears to accept the guilty plea as determinative,
without allowing real inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the entry of
the plea. While paying lip service to Johnson, the court in reality has erected
an almost insurmountable barrier to the criminal defendant who wishes to
challenge a plea of guilty. Under the analysis of the majority the reasons
for the entry of a plea of guilty are virtually irrelevant. This standard has
74. See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Allen
v. Perini, 458 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Cox, 435 F.2d 1089 (4th Cir. 1970);
Shiflett v. Virginia, 433 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1970).
75. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
76. Judge Godbold in his dissenting opinion described the analytical process used
by the majority as a process of "confession and avoidance." 489 F.2d at 191. In ef-
fect, the majority opinion "weighed" the entry of the plea of guilty with the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel and misapplied the standard of Tollett. The entry of
the plea of guilty in open court seems to have carried much more weight with the major-
ity opinion than it was entitled to carry under Tollett and Brady, and as a result, it over-
balanced the procedural irregularities caused by Winters' counsel. Absent the showing
of gross incompetence, the guilty plea is determinative of the issue.
77. In United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Judge
Bazelon developed the standards of competence required under McMann. He rejected
the label of gross incompetence, stating that effective assistance of counsel "derives not
only from the due process clause, but from the Sixth Amendment's 'more stringent re-
quirements.'" Id. at 1202. He stated that McMann required "[that] a defendant is enti-
ed to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney .... .Id. Reasonably com-
petent, although an elusive standard, is a much more stringent standard than that of the
gross incompetence standard espoused by the majority opinion.
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no basis in constitutional doctrine, and applied literally, means as 'a practical
matter that sixth amendment rights are unenforceable.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Winters the Fifth Circuit appears to take a different approach -to the
problem of ineffective assistance of counsel -than did the Supreme Court in
McMann. Under the holding in Winters two differing standards of review
of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel emerge. For those defendants
who plead guilty to crime, a standard of gross incompetence or neglect must
be met before a plea may be set aside, while a counterpart who goes through
the trial process is subject to the guidelines of McMann, reasonably compe-
-tent counsel.
Several distinguishing features of Winters may curtail its future impact in
the Fifth Circuit. First, the plea of guilty obviously weighed heavily upon
the result reached by the majority, and in fact, the decision to deny the peti-
tion of Winters appears to have been made on the basis of the plea of guilty
with the court then backtracking to rationalize the decision on other grounds.
Second, the court did not feel that discrimination in grand jury selection pro-
cedures was so fundamental that the accused -must participate in the waiver
of that defense. The facts alone may make the Winters decision easily dis-
tinguishable in the future, but Judge Clark's opinion bespeaks a judicial atti-
tude in the Fifth Circuit which is largely unreceptive to a claim by a criminal
defendant that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. If the de-
fendant has entered a plea of guilty his burden of proof under the Winters
standard is almost insurmountable.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the decision of the majority in Win-
ters is that it brings to an end the Fifth Circuit's past practice of judicially
noting racial problems in the Deep South. The court now says that it will
not consider racial problems in its consideration of cases involving criminal
defendants, and in essence, no longer will the 'black defendant be given that
extra benefit of the doubt.
Timothy R. McCormick
Zahn v. International Paper Co.:
Meeting the Federal Jurisdictional Amount in Class Actions
International Paper Company discharged large amounts of inadequately
treated waste into the waters of Vermont's Lake Champlain. Four lakeshore
property owners, representing approximately 200 others, brought a class ac-
tion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3) 1 against the company
1. FED. R. Cv. P. 23:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
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for impairment of property rights. Federal jurisdiction was based on diver-
sity of citizenship, the named plaintiffs each alleging monetary damages suf-
ficient -to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement of the diversity stat-
ute. 2  However, the district court refused to permit the case to proceed as
a class action since the unnamed plaintiffs, each asserting separate and dis-
tinct claims, did not individually satisfy the requisite amount in controversy. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 4 and
,the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 5 Held, affirmed: When class actions,
under rule 23 (b) (3), based on diversity of citizenship, involve plaintiffs with
separate and distinct claims, each of the plaintiffs, whether named or un-
named, must individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. Zahn
v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
I. AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS To MEET
THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT REQUIREMENT
The United States Constitution places no limitation on access to the federal
courts based upon the amount in controversy. However, the Judiciary Act
of 17896 and successive acts have required a minimum jurisdictional amount.7
Various expressed purposes of this requirement have been to protect out-of-
state litigants from the bias of local tribunals,8 to protect the rightful independ-
ence of state governments,9 to save litigants from the increased expense inci-
dent to trials in federal courts, 10 and to prevent overcrowding federal court
dockets with cases involving small amounts." The legislative history of the
current statute indicates that the jurisdictional amount should be set "at a
sum of money that will make jurisdiction available in all substantial con-
troversies where other elements of Federal jurisdiction are present. The juris-
dictional amount should not be so high as to convert the Federal Courts
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in ad-
dition: . . . (3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332a (1970). The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.
3, Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
4. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
5. Id., cert. granted, 410 U.S. 925 (1973).
6. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
7. Originally, an amount in excess of $500 was required in actions based on diver-
sity of citizenship. Id. Today, the amount in controversy must exceed $10,000. 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
8. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 18-
19 (2d ed. 1973). This rationale has lost much of its validity today due to the venue
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
9. See, e.g., Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934).
10. See, e.g., Chase v. Sheldon Roller-Mills Co., 56 F. 625 (N.D. Iowa 1893).
11. Id.
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into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the
trial of petty controversies.' 12
Traditionally, plaintiffs uniting to enforce a single title or right in which
they had a common or undivided interest were allowed to aggregate their
claims to meet the jurisdictional amount. 18 However, multiple plaintiffs with
separate and distinct claims had individually to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount requirement. 14  This rule originated in 183215 and has continued as
the accepted construction of the "matter in controversy" language of the con-
trolling statutes. 16 If no claimant satisfies the minimum requirement, the suit
must be dismissed; l 7 if only some satisfy the requirement, those that do not
must be dismissed.' 8
After the effective date of the Rules,' 9 a question arose as to whether rule
23 was meant to change the traditional doctrine against aggregation of separate
and distinct claims in federal class actions. In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,10
a joinder case which involved a class of plaintiffs and was decided after the
promulgation of the Rules, the Supreme Court upheld the traditional concept
forbidding aggregation. All plaintiffs were dismissed except -the one who met
the jurisdictional amount. This traditional reasoning was then reiterated in
the federal courts when cases involving a class of plaintiffs were brought as
class actions under rule 23.21 In Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co. 2 Judge
Clark held that in "spurious '23 class actions aggregation is improper and, fur-
ther, that jurisdiction could not be supplied by adding plaintiffs who could
support jurisdiction by individually meeting the amount.24
12. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958) (emphasis added). See also
id. at 21; H.R. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
13. See, e.g., Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Scott v. Frazier, 253
U.S. 243 (1920); Troy Bank v. C.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911).
14. See cases cited note 13 supra.
15. Cf. Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 349 (1832).
16. Today, the statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). For examples of the unbroken
line of precedent interpreting the structure of the "matter in controversy" language, see
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920);
Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916); Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621 (1916);
Woodside v. Beckham, 216 U.S. 117 (1910); Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302 (1902);
Bernards Township v. Stebbins, 109 U.S. 341 (1883); Wheless v. St. Louis, 18 U.S. 379
(1851).
17. See, e.g., Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920).
18. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S.
61 (1885); Bernards Township v. Stebbins, 109 U.S. 341 (1883).
19. September 16, 1938. By Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, Congress
enacted into positive law title 28, United States Code, entitled "Judicial Code and Judi-
ciary."
20. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
21. See, e.g., Alfonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 308 F.2d 724 (5th
Cir. 1962); Troup v. McCart, 238 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1956); Hughes v. Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 199 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1952); Ames v. Mengel Co., 190 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1951); Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1947).
22. 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941).
23. Rule 23 divided class actions and labeled them as "true," "hybrid," or "spuri-
ous," depending on the nature of the claim asserted. The "true" category was defined
as involving "joint, common, or secondary" rights. "Hybrid" and "spurious" class ac-
tions each involved several rights. If the several rights arose from a specific property
or interest, the suit was termed "hybrid"; whereas if a common question of law or fact
were involved, it was termed "spurious." See 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 562 (C. Wright ed. 1960); Wright, Class Actions, 47
F.R.D. 169, 175-77 (1969).
24. 117 F.2d at 98.
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The categories of rule 23 (true, hybrid, and spurious) were ostensibly eli-
minated by the 1966 amendments as arbitrary and unworkable 25 and replaced
by a more functional approach. 26 This new approach occasioned a division
in the appellate courts as to whether the traditional interpretation of the "mat-
ter in controversy" had been changed by these amendments. 27 In the leading
case of Snyder v. Harris,28 where no plaintiff named or unnamed met ,the
jurisdictional amount, the Supreme Court settled the controversy by adhering
to the traditional rule against aggregation.29 Justice Black, writing for the ma-
jority, traced the rule against aggregation to the early joinder case of Pinel v.
Pinel,30 where aggregation of separate and distinct claims was disallowed,
and, relying heavily on Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,31 concluded that just be-
cause the amendments had given "spurious" class actions the same effect as
joinder provisions, there was no reason to treat them differently for purposes
of aggregation.32 The Court further refused to re-examine the construction
of the "matter in controversy" language, as a reformulation would increase
docket congestion and in other ways thwart the congressional intent mani-
fested by the continued re-enactment of that language.3 3 The Court held that
rule 23 could not be found to effect a change in the definition of "matter
in controversy" as to do so would put it in direct conflict with the command
of rule 82 that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to extend or limit juris-
diction in the United States District Courts . . . .,4 Thus, in effect, the
Snyder decision perpetuated the traditional categories of old rule 23, and,
with them, the traditional rule against the aggregation of separate and distinct
claims, for purposes of determining whether or not claimants may aggregate
their claims to meet the jurisdictional amount.8 5
II. ZAHN V. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO.
In Zahn the Court concluded that in a federal class action under rule
23(b) (3) where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, unnamed
plaintiffs with claims which do not meet the jurisdictional amount may not
be represented as a class by named plaintiffs whose claims do, individually,
25. See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY (1954); Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1),
81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967).
26. See Wright, supra note 23, at 170.
27. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that there had been no change
in the rule. Alvarez v. Pan Am. Life 'Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 827 (1967). The same result was reached in the Eighth Circuit in Snyder
v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968), but a contrary rule developed in the Tenth
Circuit, Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968). The Court granted
the petitions for certiorari in the latter two cases and decided them together. Snyder
v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
28. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
29. Id. at 336-37.
30. 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
31. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
32. 394 U.S. 332, 337 (1969).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Lesch v. Chicago & Eastern I11. R.R., 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1968), held
that nothing in the 1966 amendments to rule 23 changed the judicial requirements of
rule 82 and stated that the old rule 23 categories remain useful analytical tools when
the requisite jurisdictional amount is in controversy.
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meet the requirement. This result was consistent with an unbroken line of
precedent forbidding the aggregation of separate and distinct claims. 83 The
Court reasoned that it would be anomalous and unfair to require named
plaintiffs to satisfy the jurisdictional amount while allowing unnamed plain-
tiffs redress in federal court without satisfying such a prerequisite. 37  This
anomaly could be avoided only by disallowing jurisdiction or allowing all class
action plaintiffs to aggregate their claims, thereby overruling the Court's prior
interpretation of the "matter in controversy" language of the diversity statute.
The latter alternative would require disregarding the assumed congressional in-
,tent manifested by a continual re-enactment of diversity statutes containing
this language.38 Therefore, in an apparent attempt to remain consistent with
congressional intent, the Court applied the traditional concept by refusing to
allow the aggregation of separate and distinct claims.
-In further support of its position, the Court stated that had the advisory
committee for the 1966 amendments entertained any thought of departing
from the traditional approach to aggregation in class actions, there surely
would have been some express statement of that intention.8 9 This argument
begs the issue. Even if an expression of intent could be found, the reasoning
of the Snyder Court, relied upon by the Zahn majority, would render it im-
potent to effectuate any change. A departure from the -traditional approach
to aggregation would enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts by contra-
vening the statutorily mandated requirements of the "matter in controversy"
language of the diversity statute. Enlarging jurisdiction in this way is for-
bidden by rule 82.40 It is this reasoning, unaffected by the intent of the
advisory committee, which supports -the majority's conclusion that absent
some further congressional action there may be no change in -the concept of
aggregation. 41
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued that two different approaches might
have been used by the Court to grant jurisdiction. The first is a re-
examination of the "matter in controversy" language of the diversity statute.
Contradicting the opinion of the majority, Justice Brennan contended that
the jurisdictional amount requirement is a terse statement of amount only.
This statement expresses a broad directive which leaves the definition of
the requirement to the judiciary. 42 Therefore, the definition of "amount in
controversy" has not been legislatively determined but is open to judicial in-
terpretation. In interpreting this language the Court should be evolutionary,
remaining sensitive to demands of fairness and efficiency rather than follow-
ing precedent no longer applicable to present needs.43
Justice Brennan's stand in favor of a re-examination of the statutory
36. 414 U.S. at 294 n.3; see notes 28-34 supra and accompanying text.
37. Id. at 300 n.9.
38. Id. at 301.
39. Id. at 302.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 states in part: "These rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions
therein."
41. 414 U.S. at 302.




"amount in controversy" language as it applies to rule 23 is supported by
three additional arguments. First, the object of rule 23(b)(3) class actions
is "Ito get at the cases where a class action promises important advantages
of economy of effort and uniformity of result without undue dilution of proce-
dural safeguards for members of the class or for the opposing party."' 44 Since
these considerations motivated the creation of class actions in the first in-
stance, they, rather than outworn categories which the 1966 amendments at-
tempted to eliminate, should be used to decide the viability of class actions.
Second, the stated legislative purpose in setting the present jurisdictional
amount was to allow the federal courts to concern themselves only with sub-
stantial controversies. 45 The controversies involved in class actions are al-
most uniformly of substantial import and, other elements of federal jurisdic-
tion being present, to disallow them in the Zahn-type situation seems contrary
to legislative intent. Finally, the traditional aggregation concept creates rela-
tively trivial distinctions. For example, if Snyder had been brought as a
shareholders' derivative action, each shareholder would not have been re-
quired to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.46 Also, if Zahn had been brought
as an action to enjoin a nuisance, 47 jurisdiction would most likely have been
granted. 48
Moreover, even if one accedes to the extensive precedent denying aggre-
gation, Justice Brennan pointed out that "[o]nce jurisdiction has attached
to the 'action,' . . . the 'aggregation' rule has been but one of several ways
to establish jurisdiction over additional claims and parties."'49 A second ap-
proach, which the Court might have used to establish jurisdiction, is the
equally well-entrenched concept of ancillary jurisdiction. 50 By this concept,
a case or controversy comes before a district court as an entirety. In dis-
posing of the matter properly before it, the court acquires jurisdiction over
those matters raised ancillary to the main controversy which would not have
been within the court's jurisdiction had they been raised independently. 5 The
concept is governed by policy considerations of fairness and efficiency 52 and
44. Kaplan, supra note 25, at 390.
45. See note 12 supra, and accompanying text.
46. Moore & Wicker, Federal Jurisdiction: A Proposal to Simplify the System To
Meet the Needs of a Complex Society, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 13 (1973).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). This course of action was not available in Zahn as
the pulp and paper plant had already ceased operation.
48. The majority of cases seeking to enjoin a nuisance interpret the amount in con-troversy to be the value of the right which the complainant seeks to protect. See, e.g.,
American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S.
597 (1907); Bricklayers' Local No. 7 v. Bowen, 278 F. 271 (S.D. Tex. 1922). The
accounting prayed for and the recovery of damages by the complainants have been con-
sidered merely incidental to the primary relief sought. Roland v. Jumer Creek Drainage
Dist., 4 F.2d 719, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1925). See also Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand
Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942).
49. 414 U.S. 291, 305 (1973).
50. See, e.g., Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1936); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921);
Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
51. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 19 (2d ed. 1970); 1 W. BAR-
RON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 23, § 23.
52. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 51, § 9, at 21; H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note8, at 1075-81; Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal
Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1963).
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has traditionally overridden concerns with the federal workload in cases of
impleaded third parties, 53 interpleaded parties, 54 compulsory counter-
claims, 55 cross claims, 56 and intervention as a matter of right now provided
for by rule 24(a).57 Justice Brennan concluded that class actions are equally
appropriate for such treatment.5 8
The use of ancillary jurisdiction in class actions finds support in the leading
case of Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble59 where the Supreme Court
extended federal jurisdiction to non-appearing members of a class, who, if
originally joined, would have destroyed diversity jurisdiction. Justice Bren-
nan found it difficult to understand why the practical approach taken by the
court in Ben-Hur must be abandoned where the purely statutory "matter in
controversy" requirement is concerned.
The majority's position becomes increasingly difficult -to comprehend when
one considers the extent to which the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal
Rules have stimulated the growth of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.
Several federal courts have used -the Rules to avoid problems involving lack
of diversity of citizenship60 and jurisdictional amount.6 ' ,In recent joinder
cases under rule 20, the aggregation doctrine, in light of the doctrine of ancil-
lary jurisdiction, has not been used to limit jurisdiction.6 2  These develop-
ments cast doubt on the present validity of relying on Clark v. Paul Gray,
Inc.6 3 and the argument that class actions should be treated no differently
from other joinder cases in denying jurisdiction.
In ignoring the above approaches and arguments it appears that the Court
in Zahn, as in Snyder, was motivated by an overriding concern with the federal
workload. However, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, this objec-
tion applies to every exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.6 4 Further, a denial of
jurisdiction will impose an even heavier burden on the judiciary as a whole and
also deny class members an opportunity to assert their claims since it leads
to one of two alternative situations. If the state has a class action device,
the availability of two forums may increase the overall judicial work load.
53. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir.
1962). See also 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTcE § 0.90[3] (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 71 HAav. L. REv. 874, 906 (1958).
54. See, e.g., Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955). See also Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 53, at 913.
55. See, e.g., Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961); United Artists
Corp. v. Masterpiece Prods., 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1955). See also 1 MOORE § 0.90.
56. See, e.g., R.M. Smythe & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 291 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1961);
Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1957). See also 1 MOORE § 0.90.
57. See, e.g., Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886). See also 2 W. BARRON & A.
HOLTZO1F, supra note 23, § 593.
58. "Class actions were born of necessity. The alternatives were joinder of the en-
tire class, or redundant litigation of the common issues. The cost to the litigants and
the drain on the resources of the judiciary resulting from either alternative would have
been intolerable." 414 U.S. at 307. See also 3B MOORE §§ 23.02[1], 23.05 passim.
59. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
60. See, e.g., Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 945 (1963); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959).
61. See, e.g., Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971); Jacobson v. Atlantic
City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968).
62. Id.
63. 306 U.S. 583 (1939); see notes 20, 31, 32 supra and accompanying text.
64. 414 U.S. at 307-08.
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Furthermore, if the plaintiffs are found to constitute "no appropriate class"' 5
over which the court could exercise jurisdiction the common issues may have
to be litigated separately "possibly enlarging the federal judiciary's burden,
and ironically reversing the Court's apparent purpose."60 Conversely, if
the state has no class action device, the fact that many claims "are likely
to be worthless because the cost of asserting them on a case-by-case basis
will exceed their potential value-will do no judicial system credit."'6 7 Justice
Brennan's argument is strengthened by recent pronouncements that -the in-
creased jurisdictional amount has not substantially affected the federal case-
load.68
III. CONCLUSION
Contrary to ,the apparent intent of the advisory committee,09 the 1966
amendments as interpreted by the Court in Zahn, restrict the use of rule 23,
since in a rule 23(b)(3) action involving a multitude of plaintiffs it will
be almost impossible to ascertain whether each meets the jurisdictional
amount. It is unfortunate that the Court so chose to truncate the rights of
these plaintiffs by resorting to outworn categories, which the 1966 amend-
ments attempted to eliminate, and a concept of aggregation which ignores
the fact that class actions are of substantial import involving essentially a
single claim, ,the adjudication of which, if not allowed as a class action, will
necessitate piecemeal litigation, inconsistent results, unfairness, and an ulti-
mate waste of judicial time and effort. It is also unfortunate that the Court
chose to ignore Ben-Hur and the growth of the concept of ancillary jurisdic-
tion. In light of the considerable importance of class actions the Zahn Court's
decision seems "both unwarranted and unwise. '' 70
Josephine Jenkins
65. Id. at 308 n.1O.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. The late Chief Justice Warren has reported that while the increase from $3,000
to $10,000 in 1958 "did result in a temporary reduction in the filing of private civil
cases, the net effect on the workload has been very slight." Warren, Address to the
American Law Institute, 25 F.R.D. 213 (1960).
69. The Zahn ruling directly contravenes the actual expansive intent of the framers
of the 1966 Amendments. See Wright, supra note 23; Kaplan, supra note 25.
70. 414 U.S. at 312.
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